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Abstract
The paper derives formulas for optimal taxation in a stylized Applied General Equi-
librium (AGE) model, and shows their potential empirical significance. Because of the
Armington-assumption for exports and imports, the formulas are quite different from
those of the 'textbook' model of optimal taxation. As a result, tax reforms that in-
crease welfare in the 'textbook' model, may not do so in the AGE model. An empirical
example for Norway is given.
1 Introduction
This paper concerns optimal taxation in a stylized Applied General Equilibrium (AGE)
model'. The aim of the paper is to provide an explicit analytical background for tax
policy experiments analyzed by Applied General Equilibrium models' I derive rules
for optimal taxation in a stylized AGE model, and show how these rules may guide the
interpretation of an actual policy experiment.
The paper shows that the rules for optimal taxation in the AGE model are quite
different from those of the 'textbook' models, which typically are partial models Or
models of closed economies'. To use the 'textbook' model to interpret what happens
in the AGE-model, therefore may lead to quite misleading results. For instance, it is
a rule of thumb from the 'textbook' model that intermediates should not be taxed in
second best. In the AGE-model, taxing intermediates creates no problems, and may
even be a necessary part of first best.
More generally, tax policy suggestions that raises welfare when assessed by the text-
book' model, may not do so when evaluated by the AGE-model. This has considerable
practical relevance. For instance, one of the experiments of the empirical part of this pa-
per demonstrates that a policy shift to pure lump sum taxation actually lowers welfare
in a model of the Norwegian economy.
'The first AGE model was constructed by Johansen (1960). Comprehensive surveys of AGE-models
and their applications are offered by Shaven and Whalley (1984) and Borges (1986). Bergman (1985)
surveys the nordic tradition. Whalley (1988) surveys some tax policy models. Robinson (1989) surveys
models of developing countries.
2Tax policy applications of AGE models were pioneered by Harberger (1962), (1966), focusing on
incidence effects and welfare costs of capital taxation. Capital taxation remains one of the most popular
areas of study, see eg. Shaven and Whalley (1972), Jorgenson and Yun (1986, 1989), Fullerton and
Henderson (1989), Goulder and Summers (1989). Other themes include the marginal cost of taxation
(eg. Hansson and Stuart (1985), Ballard, Shaven and Whalley (1985)), welfare effects of reform in indirect
taxation (eg. Clarete and Whalley (1987), Ballard, Scholz and Shaven (1988)), and consumption taxation
(eg. Fullerton, Shown and Whalley (1983), Makin (1989)).
3The standard reference is Diamond and Minies (1971). Mirrles (1986) gives an up to date exposition.
Dixit (1985) surveys models of open economies. Drize and Stern (1987) state results on optimal taxation
relative to arbitrary restrictions on available instruments.
The question arises as to why such peculiarities occur. The paper indicates that the
modelling of foreign trade is essential.
According to the authoritative survey of Shoven and Whalley (1984), the research
program of AGE economics is "to convert the Walrasian general equilibrium struc-
ture from an abstract representation of the economy into realistic models of actual
economies" (p.1007). One concession to reality that modelers usually make, at least
when assuming mobile factors of production, is to drop the "small open economy"
assumption common of analytical models of open economies. The reason is that this as-
sumption leads to excessive specialization of production, and does not allow for imports
and exports of the "same" good.
As an alternative, the so-called Armington assumption is often employed, see Arm-
ington (1969). This assumption says that domestically consumed goods are composites
of domestic and foreign varieties. Exported goods are varieties of composite goods on the
world market. Relative prices determine the relative size of each variety in a composite.
If the price of, say, the foreign variety rises, the foreign share falls. Countries therefore
face downward sloping demands for their exports, a fact which curbs the tendency to
specialize in a few industries.
The Armington assumption therefore contributes to a diversified structure of pro-
duction in equilibrium. Over the years, this has been important practical argument for
employing the assumption. Moreover, it has been justified as an approximate model of
competition in diversified products 4 .
The downward-sloping export demand curves create differences between optimal
taxation in the AGE-model, and the 'textbook' model. The reasoning is familiar from
the theory of optimal tariffs as formulated by Johnson (1951-52) (who credit Bickerdike
(1906) for the first suggestion of the idea): Whenever possible, a country should use
tariffs to improve its terms of trade. It is perhaps not very surprising that this argument
can be applied in the case of Armington export demand functions, and one can certainly
find verbal comments to that effect in the literature (Whalley and Yeung (1984), Hirte
'See Norman (1990) for a critical evaluation of this claim.
and Wiegard (1988) de Milo and Robinson (1989)). However, it seems fair to say that the
AGE- literature as a whole has not emphasized the effect of the Arrnington assumption
upon results. The price elasticities of trade are for instance not typically included in
the sensitivity analyses so common in the literature. Neither are they discussed in
most studies of actual of hypothetical tax reforms, except, possibly, for studies of tariff
reductions (Whalley (1980)). By the results of the present paper, the AGE literature
should direct more attention to the effect of the Armington assumption on all kinds
of tax policy experiments, and even on other normative experiments in the field of
environmental policy, deregulation, development etc.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the analytical model
employed. Section 3 derives 'first' and 'second' best optimal taxation in the model, and
points to different ways of implementing the optima. Section 4 gives some indication
of the practical importance for the results derived. Using a large scale, empirically
estimated AGE model, the sensitivity of optimal tax calculations to the elasticities of
foreign trade is demonstrated. Section 5 concludes, and gives some opinions on the
fruitfulness of the Armington assumption as opposed to other alternatives.
2 The model
This section sets out the model. Consumers' and producers' behaviour are examined,
and the equations describing their behaviour is combined to describe the full model.
2.1 Consumer behaviour
There are k consumers, indexed 1 ... h . . . k. Market behaviour of consumer no. h in our
economy can be described as the outcome of a two stage utility maximization process.
At the top level, she solves the problems
max Uh(ct,... ,c!,/h) s.t. Ep;c— qvh	 (1)
5.1
where
pci = b;(1 t;)
	
(2)
qf = qi (1 tf)
	
(3)






C, is consumption of composite good j by consumer h, lh is labour supply of consumer
h, p; is the consumer price of composite j, b; is the price net of tax of the composite. t;
is the consumer tax on the composite, qf is the net of tax wage rate of consumers (all
consumers earn the same hourly wage), qi is the gross wage rate received by consumers,
tf is the consumer tax rate on wage income.
rh is total lump sum income of consumer h, consisting of capital income and gov-
ernment grants. K" is an exogenous amount of capital owned by consumer h. 411 is the
consumer net of tax rate of return to capital. qk is the gross rate of return, ancl tck is
the consumer tax on capital income. Th is the lump sum grant directed at consumer h.
Utility maximization yields demand functions for consumer composites and a labour
supply function
	= 	 qf ,ris)	 (6)
	ih  =	 (91	 qf, rh)	 (7)
6In this paper, superscript h is used for consumers, superscript j for producers, subscripts j or
sometimes i are used for goods/varieties (goods from the point of view of producers, varieties from
the point of view of consumers). Superscript c denotes prices/taxes which are common to all consumers.
Subscript m denotes the good/variety m. The subscript d is used to denote a domestic variety, f for
foreign variety and a for an exported good. The variable p is used for purchasers' price of goods/varieties,
and q for inputs. b is used for sellers' price, and for Armington price indices. All taxes, t, are 'ad valorem',
as is standard in AGE models.
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and an indirect utility function Vh(pl ... pc., qf , rh).
In accordance with the Armington approach to foreign trade, we assume each con-
sumer composite to consist of a foreign and a domestic variety, that is c, = ci(4,
where cj, is the domestic variety and c if̀i is the foreign variety. For simplicity, we assume
the same aggregator function ci (.) for all consumers. At the bottom level consumer h
solves the problem
max ci 	 • Pcf3	 thb =
	
(8)
where total outlays on composite no. j, 4, is given from the solution to the top level
problem6 . The consumer price of the imported variety, pcn , is defined as pen bf, (1 fi )
ie the world market price plus a tariff. The consumer price of the domestically produced
variety, pcdi , is defined as pcdj = bdi(1 t4), the producer output price adjusted for an ad
valorem tax.
c	 j) is homogeneous of degree 1. Associated with the problem (8) is the ex-
penditure function e(pcfj , pcdi , c,), which takes the separable form I); (pcii ,Kii)c, because
of homogeneity kcj (-) is a homogeneous of degree one price index of c, usually a CES-
function in applied work. Using Shepards lemma, the sub demand functions corre-






C h• is the import demand equation for consumer variety j. Imports depend on the
aPfi 2
relative price of the domestic versus foreign variety (since b; is homogeneous of degree
8 be.
one), and on the domestic activity level (represented by c"). It may be that—I- Ba 0 for
aPcu
6The problem (8) is equivalent to
max ci(	 .t. pcfj (1 + t)ejti +4(1+	 = -	 (9)
where a, is equal to a,(1 +	 It may be more plausible to assume that the consumer allocates a, at
the 'top' level, than a,. Because of homogeneity, equation (9) yields the same demands as equation (8).
some variety j. In that case, the composite j is domestically produced only. If — a- 1,8pc .I •
the good is imported only.
2.2 Producer behaviour
The economy consists of n single output producers indexed 1— j ... n. Outputs are
produced according to constant returns to scale technologies. Production behaviour in
an industry can be described as if a representative producer maximizes unit profits:
max b4i fi (zli , zki , z	 zli – qikzk 	 qz
	
(12)
where fi(.) is the unit production function, and z11 , zki and zmi are unit scale inputs
of labour, capital and material input. The latter is a produced, composite good, le. it
consists of an imported and a domestically produced variety. The former two are non
produced: Labour is supplied by consumers according to their labour supply schedules,
while real capital is assumed to be exogenously supplied. qi = (1 -F tid is the producer
price of labour input, with tit the producer tax and qi the price paid to consumers.
Similarly, qi = qk (1 tik ) with tik the tax and qk the price paid to consumers. Finally,
= (1 + Om) with tin, the tax and bin, the net of tax price index.
The outcome of the profit maximization process is (homogeneous of degree zero)
unit scale input demand functions
zli = zl (qt , 	 ern. ) 	 (13)
zki = zki (qt , 	 (14 )
zm • 	 zmi 	 ql, ent•
	
(15)
and a unit profit function
bdi –	 , q, q(7 )	 (16)
In most AGE-models, material input zmi is a price independent constant (Leontief
technology). Our model is more flexible on this point, it contains Leontief technology
as a special case only.
b — ei (4, 40 q4s)4 .7 =
Regarding the composition of material input, we may use the same method as in





ztn4i	 id	 zmi 	 (18)apm 
where Om = f ,n) is the price of composite material input, net of tax on the
composite (but including taxes on the varieties). Note that the domestic variety of
material output is produced in industry m.
2.3 The complete model
The formal model is
k
E	 ns( . . . pf.„ qf, rh) = Ee 	 ,	 qtn)yi
it=1	 1=1
n
K = E zki (4,
n 	 n 	 ab, k
E Pal Pal) = E	 E c"(pl	 qf ,
i=m+1	 =1 " P11
abim 	• •
+bin, E 	 Zrni 	 q70Yi
i=iaPfm
abc. kE (74 ... p qf,rh)
"Pdj h=i
ab,cn k h
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t'Pedm h=i
n abint*
+g,„ E	 zm , k m ,yi
1=1 alidm
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b(pcf1, 6)(1 ta;) 	 (26)
Pell = bfi(1 tf ) 	(27)
Pcdi = b4 (1 tdi )	 (28)
qf = qi (1 tn	 (29)
qt = q/ (1	 (30)
ek = q k(1 tik )	 (31)
q4, = b,i(Pif 'To pm) ( 1 + tint)	 (32)
Pi
	 = b1„,(1 tifm )	 (33)
Pidm = p,n(1 tid,n)	 (34)
Paj = b di (1 t	 (35)
and the relation between lump sum income and lump sum taxes are given as
rh = ql.Kh Th	 (36)
= q k (1 —	 (37)
Equations (19) are the no-profit conditions associated with pure competition and con-
stant returns to scale. Equation (20) says that demand for labour equals the supply
of labour. y; is total domestic output of good/variety j. Equation (21) says that total
demand for real capital is equal to total supply of real capital, K , where K = EL Kh .
Equation (22) gives the current account. Balance in trade of goods and services
is assumed. The foreign variety of the material input, and the foreign varieties of the
consumption goods are imported at given world prices. To pay for imports, the goods
labeled m 1 to n are exported. (Thus there are n — m export-competing industries).
2 denotes exported quantities, pai export prices. Though exporters of an industry
assume they can sell all of their exports at a given price, export quantities are declining
functions of export prices on the macro level. A rationalization of this constellation is
that each exporter is small relative to the market he is in. The export demand function
is therefore fiat from the point of view of each individual exporter, even though it
declines for the industry as a whole7 . The export demand functions are Armington-
export demand functions where prices of the 'world' variety of each good and any other
explanatory variables (such as market indicators) are constant. Foreign exchange is
numeraire in the model.
Equations (23) to (25) are the commodity balance equations. The m — 1 first goods
may either be used for consumption (the domestic variety of the consumption composite)
or for exogenous public expenditure, gi. Good m may in addition be used as a factor of
production (the domestic variety of composite material input). The n — m last goods
may be used for consumption, public expenditure or for exports. Equations (26) to (37)
define the relation between prices and taxes.
There are lin m -F 4 equations in the models and lin m +4 endogenous variables
(b47 	 ek, q771 , Paj, 	P: ,P et' , Pdy	 Pid qf ql qk and one of the tax transfer and
government expenditure variables g5 , t11 , t , t,, t , t, 	tid., tL, tal , t7, ). Imbedded
in the model is the public budget constraint
n
E elfc • -I- E t jbfj.7
1=1 	 i=1
n
.1)(4c* 	 E tizl1y1 + qk E t kiyi
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7Note that industries producing for the domestic market are treated symmetrically. They, too, are
assumed to take the price as given, but face downward sloping market demand curves.
'Excluding eq. (36) and (37). It proves convenient to collect all lump sum income in one variable, rh.
9
=	 116 	 (42)
h=1
Equation (38) makes it clear that the public sector runs a balanced budget. This is an
implication of Valras law, which in this model can be stated as follows: As consumers
keep within their budget constraint, profits are zero and the current account is balanced,
the public budget must be balanced as well.
The model is a stylized AGE model. This means that AGE mpdels typically in-
corporate some of the crucial features of the present model. AGE models generally
contain some exporting industries, and some importing9 . At least one produced input
is generally assumed, while one factor, labour, generally is supplied by consumers.
The Armington model of foreign trade is employed by eg. Holtsmark et.al .(1991),
Boadway and Treddenick (1978), Whalley (1980), Dixon et.al . (1982), Jorgenson and
Wilcoxen (1989), Goulder and Summers (1989), Bovenberg (1989). Others, eg. Dervis,
De Milo and Robinson (1982) and Ballard et. al. (1985) use the assumption of down-
ward sloping demand for exports without referring to the Armington theory'. The
assumption of an exogenous supply of capital is employed eg. by Stuart (1984), Hans-
son and Stuart (1985) and Holtsmark et. al. (1991).
Moreover, the capital stock of a given period is predetermined in the models of eg.
Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1989), Goulder and Summers (1989) and Bovenberg (1989).
These, and similar dynamic models consist of equations like those of the present model,
Obi F= 0 for all j, that is no 'imports either.r. The model is then one of a closed economy.O
lrånThe model and the CET: The constant elasticity of transformation (CET) formulation of exports was
first suggested by Powell and Gruen (1968), and has recently become popular in the AGE-literature (eg.
de Milo and Robinson (1989), Robinson (1989)). It says that production is a composite of two varieties,
one for domestic use, and one for exports. By a suitable change of interpretation, the present model
captures this assumption. Consider the consumption aggregate cj =	 c11). Inverting this equation
for a non-exporting industry with zero government demands yields yi = cdi(c1,c11), where yi
When c11 is negative, it is an export variety, and the function is a CET export transformation function.
Rules for taxation of imports derived in the present model will for this reason apply to CET exports _
as well. Government demand and Armington exports can be included in the new commodity balance
equations (which must be formulated in what we in this paper call aggregates) without problems.
'The model and the closed economy: Assume m = n, that is no exporting industries, and - E.,: 0,
8Pefi
10
= W(V 1 (74. 	qf , r	 Vk(p
[E oi(b4i — ent. ))
n
i=1
plus equations for savings and capital accumulation. The model of this paper is therefore
similar to the intratemporal subset of these models, and the conditions we derive, will
be a subset of the conditions to be derived in the case of intertemporal models.
3 First and second best optimal taxation
This section characterizes necessary conditions for first' and second' best optimal tax-
ation. First best' denotes the case where all kinds of tax instruments, including indi-
vidual specific lump sum taxes, are available. 'Second best' denotes the case where a
general poll tax and a full set of distorting taxes are available, but individual lump sum
taxes are ruled out.
In both cases, one finds the structure of optimal taxation through maximizing the
social welfare function W(V 1(p p , qf , r 1) Vk(pl pf„ qi, rk)) s.t. the model (19)
to (25) 11 . The price structures facing the agents of the economy are under government
control, thanks to the assumption of a full set of distorting taxes. Equations (26) to
(35), representing the relations between prices, are therefore not included as constraints.
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11 Note that the public budget constraint is implied by the model equations, as asserted above. If
the public budget constraint were to be an explicit constraint in the maximization problem, it could
substitute for one of the model equations.
11
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The Lagrangian multipliers of the problem are of course the social values of marginally
relaxing the corresponding constraints. They can be interpreted as shadow prices. In
particular, 1.1 is the social value of marginal unit of foreign exchange, or the shadow
exchange rate. We are interested in welfare rankings. Obviously, different scalings of
the welfare function yield different valuations of a unit of foreign exchange, or different
values of without changing the ranking. We can fix the scale by making p. (or some
•other variable) the numeraire of the shadow price system. Choosing p. as the numeraire
has the benefit of making market prices and shadow prices be measured in the same
unit, i.e. foreign exchange.
ce is the shadow wage rate, p is the shadow rate of return, and vi is the shadow
	output price of good/variety j	 to vn appear twice).
The controls of the maximization problem are the composite consumer prices 1.1
and wage rate qf, , the good/variety prices ko , the input prices qt, 4, and 4, output
quantities y , prices of domestic and imported consumption varieties, pedi and p, prices
of the domestic and imported varieties of material input, pidm and ifm , and export
prices pap In second best taxation, a uniform poll tax completes the set of available
tax instruments for the government. In the first best case, we allow, as mentioned, for
individual lump sum taxes to be set optimally.
Notice that the consumer net of tax rate of return to capital ql is not included in
the set of controls, neither in 'second best' nor 'first best'. The reason is that in the
model, taxing capital will just amount to a special kind of a poll tax, namely one where
consumers are taxed according to their share of the total capital stock. The effect on
savings and capital formation is disregarded. Discussing the 'optimal' rate of capital




taxation of consumers based on this assumption is rather fruitlessl .
3.1 First order conditions and a simple implementation scheme
This section derives the first order conditions and presents a simple structure of taxes
to implement the optimum.
3.1.1 Import tariffs
We start by considering the issue of whether there should be tariffs on imports. The
point of departure is the following four first order conditions:
82 k 	a2b;	 1, (92 k
	C =
	 E	
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a2b,;,,	 . v a2p.m*2 )age 
Ay, zm, (b f     :17- 0	 (47)
aPjdm	 aPifmaPidm + m aidm
i = 1 . . . n
These conditions say that, for a given level of composite demand, the net social cost
of increasing the price of a variety is zero. That is, the marginal benefit of switching to
a variety is equal to the marginal cost of switching away from the other.
To interpret the equations, it is helpful to apply Euler's theorem and Young's the-
orem on the partial derivatives of the 1).; and b 	 recalling that I); and b/m.
 
are
12Generally, an exogenous consumer rate of return to capital is not compatible with an exogenous
consumer tax-rate of capital. Recall the relation ql = (1 - t)qk. The pre tax rate of return qk is
endogenous in the model. Any changes in this rate will carry over to changes in consumer income, unless
the consumer capital tax rate is endogenous. It must function as a 'buffer'. An exception is the case
of an exogenous 100 per cent tax, which leaves the consumer rate of return constant at zero no matter
the pre tax rate. This special case relates the model to the literature on optimal taxation in decreasing
returns (or fixed factor) economies, which assumes 100 per cent profits taxation for the optimal taxation
results to hold (Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971)).
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homogenous of degree one functions with derivatives homogenous of degree zero:
82b;	 a2b;
J'efiWcf; 1341 apfuaPcf;
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Comparing equations (44)	 (47) to (48) — (51), it is clear that pefi =-  kiibii , pcd,
= klbjm, Fr7dm = gym at the optimum, with kli and k commodity and activity
specific constants which are there because only relative prices matter in import demand
(and domestic demand) functions. In particular, kli and kl may be equal to unity for all
j (a price normalization). If this is the case, pefi = bii ,	 = bfm , Pim =
and we can write
ab;	 ab;
u	 + p1 apcdi b;(pCfp Pcdi) (52)
L ao	 abim
bim'—87-7ipn + vm apidm	 bL(Pjfm,	 (53)
Equations (52) and (53) are useful for future reference.
Let us pursue an implication of the result that the purchaser's prices of imports are
equal to the world market prices of imports, Ku = bii, bim. From equations (27)




pif,n 1 b fin --- 1 = 0 (55)
In other words: Tariffs on imports should be zero. This of course is a familiar rule for
a price-taking economy, but it may be little more surprising to find it show up in a
model that adopts the Armington approach to foreign trade. The notion that domestic
competitors do not lose all sales to importers when their price rises, seems to indicate
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that there is some market power somewhere to be exploited by tariffs. This is not correct
however, and the reason is that imported goods are imported at a given world price.
The price elasticity of demand for domestic vis a vis foreign varieties is ,a reflection of
preferences (consumers) and technology (producers), and is irrelevant for tariff policy.
We will notice below that it is a different story for exports.
3.1.2 Producer taxation
To derive the conditions for producer taxation, we follow a detailed procedure starting
by establishing the equality between market factor prices and shadow market prices.
We then establish that industry output prices are equal to shadow prices on output.
That granted, we can wind up the rates of producer taxation, first on domestically
produced material input, then on composite material input and finally on labour and
capital input.
Start by considering the following four equations,
oc
—1101 = 0
____ . azli 	azki	 av;„ 	abL,	 azrn,
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where equation (56) shows that the zero profit constraint is not binding. That is,
the marginal value of letting prices diverge from costs, is zero. The reason is that
purchasers prices are optimal. If not, there would be a premium on the zero profit
condition, welfare could be improved if prices were allowed to diverge away from costs
in the direction of optimal prices. As it is, the government possesses the power, through
taxation to present optimal price structures to each agent, and is not limited by the no
15
profit condition in any way.
Using equation (56) and (53) and making some obvious eliminations we reach the
more convenient form
az azki 	awn,




az	 azli 	 azki 	 . azm•	p- b,,Im 	2 = O
aql	 agi
a 	 azi,	 azk, Li azm,
aq!n 	(1) agt P-avn -+- 	 aggin 	= 0
where &In Ign (pip,„ pid,n).
Equations (60), (61) and (62) say that, for a given level of output, the net social
cost of increasing an input price is zero at the optimum. That is, the cost of the inputs
one switches into when a price increases, is exactly matched by the reductions in costs
of the inputs one switches away from.
özl •Note that	 =	 etc. Now use the same technique as above, apply Eulers8q31 	8q1
theorem and Youngs theorem on the derivatives of the ei(qt,q10 4), that is on the zli ,
zki and zmi functions. Thus, it is clear that ql = k21w, q = kup, q•in kub', where
ku is some (industry specific) constant which is there because only relative prices matter
in the input demand functions. In particular, ku may be unity (a price normalization),
which is the alternative pursued here.
Consider the following first order condition,




\ This equation says that production should break even at shadow prices, a very general
property of constant returns models (Diamond and Mirrles (19'76)).
Using equation (53) and the result that qi = w, q = p, q(,  = b , the condition
simplifies to
ae :1/1 —	 m; =o	 (64)uyi
from which is obvious that vi = b4, the output prices of industries are equal to the
shadow prices of production at the optimum.
16
We are now in a position to determine the optimal taxes to face producers. Begin
by considering the optimal tax on the domestic variety of intermediate inputs. From
equation (34) and the fact that id„;
tid,n = pid,n/p„,, — 1 0 (65)
le. there should be no taxation of the domestic variety of material input. Now
consider the tax on composite material input. From equation (32) and the fact that
= b"n.
ti = 4/14n* —1=o (66)
In other words, there should be no taxation of composite material input. Combined
with the zero tax rate on the domestic variety of material inputs, and the rule of no
tariffs on the imported variety, we can conclude that material inputs should not be
taxed.
This is of course a very familiar rule from the theory of optimal taxation in models
with production. The intuition is that if demand and supply did not face the same
prices, aggregate production could be increased by making them equal.
Next, consider the taxes on labour and capital input. It follows from the result that
P,q3k = w, that qk = kkp, qz = kiw where kk and ki are two constants which concern
the overall division of taxation of labour and capital between producers and consumers.
In particular, they may be unity (equality between shadow price and net of tax input
price). If that is the case, the tax rates on labour and capital input will be
tik = Plqk —1=0 (67)
ti w I -- 1 = 0 (68)
ie. neither capital nor labour are taxed. Since material inputs is not taxed either , we
can conclude that production should be left untaxed altogether. An implication is that
the marginal rates of transformation between inputs will be equal for all producers.
This is the Diamond and Mirrles rule of efficiency in production in an optimally taxed
general equilibrium model (Diamond and Mirrles (1971)). The intuition is that the
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government should bring production to the production, possibility frontier, and use its
ability to distort all relative consumer prices to bring in the required revenue and fulfill
equity concerns.
When production is untaxed, the market values of the marginal products of inputs
will of course be equal. This observation is useful for the discussion of section 3.2.
3.1.3 Taxes on exports
Next, we consider taxation of exports. The relevant rule is derived from the following
first order condition, which applies to exporting industries only:
ac 	, dai 	,	 da • 	„
= 	 = 0 	 j	 + 1 . . . n	 (69)
uPai	 uPai	 uPai
The following way of writing this equation is helpful:
ae
n	 Vi Pai	 U
"Paj 	
rn + 1 . n	 (70)
p„ d awhere e • =	 ,i the (absolute value of the) price elasticity of demand for good j.
Equation (70) says that at the optimum, the relationship between shadow product
price and world market price is described by means of a simple elasticity rule equal to
that of monopoly pricing. The country should behave like a monopolist vis a vis the
foreign market.
The tension between this optimum condition and the price taking behaviour of
competitive exporters in an unregulated market, motivates a tariff. The size of the
tariff is found by using equations (35) and (70) and the fact that 14 = vi ,
1	 1
	  1= 	
1— 11 ei 	 i — 1
(71)
The tariff, when formulated as a fraction of the net of tariff export price, should equal
one over the price elasticity of export demand minus one. This is the 'optimal tariff' of
Johnson (1951-52).
The economic rationale for the tariff is to exploit the monopoly power inherent in
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structure assumed within the exporting industries, no single agent is able to make use
of the industry's position vis a vis the world market. In other words, the market power
is not 'internalized by the agents of the industry, and there is an external effect type
incentive for the government to intervene.
However, this incentive depends on the value of the elasticities. Imagine the demand
elasticities being parametrically increased to infinity. This will make the model approach
'the small open case' on the export side. The optimal tariffs are zero in the limiting case
of a tcompletely price taking economy. The empirical relevance of the optimal tariffs will
therefore be greater when the terms of trade elasticities are small'.
Notice the important difference in the model between imports and exports. Exports
should be subject to a tariff, while imports should not. The reason for the difference is
simply that exports are traded at prices that depend on export volume (or rather the
other way around), while we recall that imports are traded at given world prices. In
other words, the Armington approach assumes the market power to belong to exporters,
not to importers. In some AGE models, like the BFSW model of Ballard et. al. (1985)
for instance, import prices depend on imported quantities. In that case, non-zero import
tariffs will be optimal.
3.1.4 Consumer taxation
Consider next the conditions for taxation of consumers, and start by identifying the tax
on the domestic composite of the consumer composites. From equation (28) and the
results that p56 vi = b4; we have:
tdi = pc4i /b4 — 1 = O (72)
le. the tax on the domestic variety should be zero. Since there is to be no taxation of
imports either, the conclusion is that consumption within the composites should not be
taxed. The conditions for taxation of the composites are given as
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where the symbol r is used to denote a general element of lump sum income, a (negative)
poll tax. Equation (73) says that the welfare weighted gain to consumers of lowering a
price (through lowering a tax) is to be equal to the social cost, valued at shadow prices,
of the extra demands and labour supply induced. Equation (74) says the same for the
case of an increase in the consumer wage rate. Equation (75) says that the welfare
weighted gains from an increased uniform grant should be equal to the social costs of
the extra demands and labour suppli induced.
After a few manipulation involving equation (52), Roys identity, the definition
Whnh = ßh, the result that co =--- q, equations (26) and (29) to define consumer prices,
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Equation (76) to (78) are the 'standard' formulas for consumer taxation. The number
of consumer tax rates is one more than is actually needed to implement the optimum.
For instance, if it is possible to tax all consumer demands and labour supply, it is
unnecessary to use uniform poll taxes as well. Any common factor in the taxation of
h=1
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consumer demands and labour supply will have the same effect. Formally, one of the
first order conditions (76) to (78) can be derived from the others. This means that the
government has one degree of freedom in setting the actual values of the consumer tax
rates. It can for instance decide not to prescribe any poll taxes, while taxing goods
proportionally. Or it can decide not to tax some good. A uniform poll tax plus taxes
on the remaining goods and supply of labour suffices to implement an optimum. Or it
can decide on some intermediate solution.
It is not straightforward to judge from equations (76) and (78) what the actual
optimal tax rates on consumer composites will be. However, almost all AGE-models
that have been built to date, assume weak separability between labour and other goods,
and linear Engel curves for goods with intercepts being either identical, or depending
on observable characteristics only's. In these cases, one can apply the results of Deaton
(1979) or Deaton and Stern (1986), which say that uniform indirect taxes on goods
combined with poll taxes depending only on observable characteristics (identical when
characteristics are identical), implements the optimum.





When equation (82) applies, t; ti = 0 in equations (76) and (77). The government
brings in the required revenue and reach its equity objectives purely with the aid of
individual specific lump sum taxes.
3.1.5 Main conclusions
This result finalizes the derivation of the simplest structure of optimal taxation in the
AGE model. We summarize that the structure is characterized by the following three
principles:
13To my knowledge, the only model not making this assumption is Wilcoxen (1988), Jorgenson and
VVikoxen (1989). They maintain the separability assumption and have intercepts depending only on
observable characteristics but the Engel curves for their five 'main' goods are translog, ie. non-linear.
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• leave the production sector untaxed.
• tax consumer composites according to the standard principles implying uniform
taxation, given the preference structure of most models)
• levy a (sector specific) tariff on exports
Some implications of these principles have already been drawn. Let us notice at this
-point that tariffs are part of, first best taxation. The reason is obviously, that tariffs in
this model will not distort the domestic economy, just hurt foreigners.
The tariff part of the optimal taxation structures is likely to bias the results of policy
experiments using AGE models. For instance, the 'marginal cost of public funds' when
funds are raised by tariffs, is likely to be small (Vennemo(1990)). But even the projected
benefits from removing distortions in the production sector are likely to be affected by
the terms of trade effects.
3.2 Alternative optimal structures
Because of its simplicity, the optimal taxation structure involving zero producer taxa-
tion, standard optimal consumer taxation and a tariff, as concluded in the last section, is
a 'natural' structure by which to implement the optimum conditions in the AGE model.
But it is by no means the only one. We have already mentioned thAt a multitude of
combinations of consumer indirect taxes, consumer wage tax and a general consumer
poll tax may implement an optimum. The present section addresses the same kind
of phenomenon with respect tà producer taxation, tariffs etc. and shows alternative
tax structures that may implement the optimum. We start by giving an example of
an optimal taxation structure in which export tariffs are implicit only. Afterwards, we
summarize the information of the first order conditions by giving a general implemen-
tation scheme, showing the relation between taxes that must hold at the optimum. An
example of an "artificial" tax structure that nevertheless is optimal, is given.
22
3.2.1 Optimal taxation without tariffs
If, for some reason, export tariffs are zero in the model, the question arises of whether
factor taxation will act as implicit tariffs. We will look closer at this possibility.
In the comments to equations (60) to (62) we derived the conditions that qt =
kuw, q = kup, qlen, = kub'„,, where ku is some industry specific constant. Consider
now the case of k2i = 1_ 11 e in the exporting industries, while ku 1 in the non
exporting industries. In the exporting industries, we will now have the following set of
equations (using equation(70)):
1 1	 —11







from which it follows that pai = b4 , je. tariffs should be zero.
On the other hand, factor inputs should be taxed at a tariff equivalent rate:
ti 	411",„. 	= k
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Apparently, parallel ad valorem industry specific input taxes in exporting industries
are able to substitute perfectly for actual tariffs. The economic intuition is as follows:
By taxing factors, costs rise in the taxed industries, and output prices must follow
suit (because of the no profit condition). Prices rise by the same rate as if they were
subject to a tariff. The result is unchanged export quantities as compared with directly
taxed exports. In the input markets, the input taxes cancel when calculating marginal
rates of transformation. These stay unchanged, therefore, and the production efficiency
theorem continues to hold. In fact, nothing changes in the quantity solution which is
not strange, provided the optimum is unique.
The effect on the formal character of the optimal tax structures is great, however.
For one thing, it is no longer true that intermediate inputs should be untaxed. We have
driven a tax wedge between the producer of material inputs and consumers of material
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inputs in the exporting industries. Second, exporting industries should face different
prices on their inputs, which is to say that the market values of the marginal products of
different industries should differ. Both of these results violate familiar 'rules of thumb'
from optimal tax theory.
The question of differential taxation of capital has received some attention in the
public finance literature recently (see eg. Feldstein (1990), Hagen and Kanniainen
(1990)). This literature emphasizes either the heterogeneity of capital, or the difficulties
of taxing all kinds of capital income as reasons for differential taxation of capital. The
results of this section show that in the absence of tariffs, terms of trade effects in exports
yields another reason for differential taxation of capital. (See Vandendorpe (1972) for
an earlier analysis along such lines.) The next section shows that the result is easily
extended to the case of exogenous (not necessarily optimal) tariffs.
For completeness it should be added that domestic coxisumption of varieties produced
by exporting industries should be 8u681d1ze4. If not, domestic consumers would be
subject to an implicit tariff as well, and that was never the objective. The size of the
subsidy (which we model as a negative tax) is:
tii = pc4i /b4 --- 1 = vi /bdi — 1 = 1/1c21 — 1 = —1/ei (87)
le. it is just equal to one over the price elasticity of export demand.
3.2.2 A general structure of taxation
The last section shows that the tax rates of the AGE model cannot be uniquely deter-
mined, there are at least two alternatives. More generally, the optimal tax rates are
functions of all the k-variables — for each non-zero value of these variables, a new set
of optimal taxes results. The best we can do is to determine the optimal tax rates as
functions of the k variables. These are
til -- 1 (88)
4n, = — 1 S (89)
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(99)
(100)
All together there are 3n + 2 independent k-variables. Thus one can achieve 3n + 2
independent goals regarding tax-rates. Choosing all k-variables to be unity yields the
particularly simple tax-structure of section 3.1.
To demonstrate the possibilities of the general formulation, consider the following
set of assumptions, which has no particular economic justification: 	 =	 kk
1, and kli = 2. It immediately follows from equation (88) that there should be
a 100 per cent tariff on all imports". On the other hand the domestic variety should
also be subject to a 100 per cent tax. This way, the relative price of the domestic
imported varieties stays the same.
versus   
14special rules apply for good m. To simplify, it is assumed that the government has the power to levy
a tariff exclusively on consumer purchases of this good.
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In consumer taxation, the formulas will now read
where
tf = – 1 (104)
le. tax-rates on consumer composites should be 100 percentage points lower than before.
This is to compensate for the increase in price that is transmitted from the taxes on
the varieties.
While it may seem inconvenient to actually implement a system which adds and
subtracts the same tax wedge at different points of the system, it is perfectly legitimate
from a formal point of view. Perhaps it greatest practical importance is to remind the
analyst that one cannot judge from a single tax rate, or a small subset of tax-rates
how far from 'optimal taxation' an economy — or a model of an economy -- is. In
particular, one cannot criticize a tax system for being inefficient just by looking at its
tariff rates.
The points demonstrated in this section is known in the public economics literature
as 'indeterminacy of taxes', or the 'independent normalization property', see eg. Mirrles
(1986) pp. 1226. The point is that as long as the price structures of each agent are fully
controlled by the government (and only relative prices matter), each can be normalized
independently, with the relation between the numeraires forming exogenous taxes.
Notice, however, that an export tax and an import subsidy will not be the same
thing in (a two industry version of) the present model. Thus the symmetry theorem of
Lerner (1936), which is possibly the most famous case of indeterminacy of taxes, cannot
be derived, in the present context. The reason is that the quantity implications of an
export tax are different from that of an import subsidy.
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4 Empirical illustrations
It sometimes happens that problems that are of theoretical interest, turn out to be of
limited practical importance. The sign of an effect may be ambiguous in theory, but in
practice, it (nearly) always goes one way.
In this light, it is of interest to investigate whether the differences in optimal taxation
between the standard 'text-book' model and the AGE-model that adopts the Armington
assumption, have significant practical effects. As an example, we will in this section
examine the effects of a hypothetical tax reform that makes the pre and post tax user
cost of capital equal. We will in other words eliminate the distortions in the capital
market. This kind of tax reform is sometimes called to 'level the playing field'. The
industry values of the marginal product of capital, evaluated at market prices, will
be equal after the reform has taken place, while differences prevail before the reform.
The difference in welfare between the two equilibria may be interpreted as the cost of
distortion in the capital market.
In the AGE model that adopts the Armington assumption, market values of the
marginal products of capital should only be equal provided exporters at the same time
are subject to a tariff that reflects the ability of the country to improve its terms of
trade (compare the comments following equations (68) or (86)). The effect of 'levelling
the playing field' is therefore ambiguous in theory. This makes it a nice testing ground
of what the Armington assumption means in practice.
The analysis of this section is not without empirical content, and should carry some
merit of its own. We measure the combined effects of interasset intersector, and in-
terindustry distortions in the capital market, using a large scale, multi-industry, esti-
mated AGE model of the Norwegian economy. The analysis, which is based on HoImOy
and Vennemo (1990), is comparable to that of Fullerton and Henderson (1989), who in a
similar fashion measure the combined effects of interasset, intersector, and interindusty
distortions in the capital market. They, too, use a large scale multi industry AGE
model of an open economy. Intertemporal issues are not emphasized. Their work is
richer than the present in that they focus on the effect of varying the elasticity of sub-
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stitution between non corporate and corporate capital, and substitution between assets.
The present analysis by contrast assumes an elasticity of substitution of zero in both
cases. On the other hand, Fullerton and Henderson do not discuss to what extent the
price elasticities of export demand influence their results.
4.1 The model
The model we use for the simulations is, with minor modifications, an applied version
of the the stylized model eq. (19) to eq. (37). The most important difference is that the
empirical model is a single consumer mociel, and that labour supply is exogenous. The
actual model features capital accumulation, but we focus here on the static 'year one'
solution with exogenous capital supply. Below is a brief description of the model'.
Start with the user cost of capital formulas. They are of the traditional Jorgenson
type, je. the user cost per NOK invested for an asset i in an institutional sector c of
industry j is written
1 — ticzi
Pcii =  (rei + 4i) (105)1 — tic
where pcji is the user cost, tic is a sector specific tax-rate, zi is the asset specific present
value of depreciation allowances, rci is a sector and industry specific alternative rate of
return, and ki is actual depreciation. rei is a weighted average of the after tax rates of
return to equity and debt. Like Fullerton and Henderson, we construct a composite user
cost of capital for an industry by weighting together separate user costs for each asset
and institutional sector. We identify four assets; structures, fishing boats, transport
equipment and machinery. Simultaneously we identify three institutional sectors; the
corporate sector, the non-corporate sector and owner occupied housing. It turns out
that the tax system 'subsidizes' the user costs of capital in Norway (the effective tax
rates on real capital are lower than on financial capital).
There are 31 industries in the model, 21 of which have endogenous behaviour. (The
other 10 are 7 public industries, drilling for oil and gas, production of oil and gas, and
ocean transport). Production is a function of labour, real capital, material and energy
'A detailed account of a slightly enlarged version of the model is found in Holtsmark et al. (1991).
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input. Substitution between factors are allowed at the level of gross production. The
cost functions are of the Generalized Leontief flexible form type, and are estimated on
Norwegian National Accounts data by Bye and Frenger (1985).
Material input, energy input and consumption goods are Armington composites, ie.
they consist of an imported and a domestic variety in a CES-aguegate. Import share
equations are estimated by Svendsen (1990) on a 1970-87 data set.
Export demand equations are introduced for most exporting industries, relating
exports to the relative price of Norwegian versus world market prices of the exports. A
loglinear functional form is chosen. This implies that the price elasticity of demand is
a constant, and the optimal tariff is a constant fraction of the cost of production see
equation (71). The exports of oil and gas related activities, and of ocean transport are
exogenous, as are the export prices of these industries.
The export price elasticities are estimated on a 1968 to 1987 data set by Lindquist
(1990). The estimates are presented in table 1 along with the optimal tariffs calculated
from equation (71). The estimated elasticities, which range between 1.23 and 3.41, with
an average of around 1.8, are slightly higher than other estimates of price elasticities of
export demand16 Nevertheless, the optimal tariffs are quite high, and generally above
100 per cent.
(table 1 about here)
The model consists of N identical consumers, each equipped with a LES consumption
system. The parameters of the consumption system are taken from the Norwegian
macroeconometric model MODAG (see Cappelen and Longva (1987) for a description).
They are estimated indirectly by using estimates of income elasticities from various
sources (mainly cross-section studies) and budget shares and a formula for translating
these estimates to the parameters of the LES-system.
16An approximate central case in the compendium of trade elasticities provided by Stern, Francis and
Schumacher (1976) is 1.4. The elasticities used by Wikoxen (1988), who cite Cline et al (1978), range
between 0.63 and 2.14.
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Welfare is measured by means of the money metric utility function of the LES
system. The function is evaluated in base year (1986) prices. The presentation focuses
on percentage changes in welfare between two equilibria, defined as




where e(.) is the expenditure function, r is the base year price vector which actually is
a vector of one's), and superscript 0 and 1 refer to the pre and post reform equilibria
respectively. e(r, U(0)) is equal to pre reform consumption outlays.
4.2 The cost of distortion with and without tariffs
(table 3 somewhere in this section)
We perform four experiments. Endogenous lump sum taxation will be a feature of
all of them. Thus, we are in a world that is capable of first best optimality.
As our first experiment, we calculate the cost of distortion in the capital market
in a 'first best' economy, including tariffs. The capital market distortion is the only
distortion in the economy. The experiment illustrates the welfare effect of removing the
distortion. We know from theory that this effect must be positive.
The optimum is implemented by setting all taxes on factors and goods except for
the capital market equal to zero, and assume the optimal tariffs of table 1. Thus we
make use of the simple implementation scheme of section 3.1.
Given these assumptions, the distortion in the Norwegian capital market turns out
to be 0.94 per cent of the welfare level in the reference scenario. That is, the utility level
calculated as a money metric in base year prices is 0.94 per cent higher in the alternative
scenario than in the reference scenario. Since welfare in the reference scenario is equal
to consumption, another interpretation is that "real consumption" would rise 0.94 per
cent if the distortions were removed.
This is not a great number perhaps, given that the circumstances are the best
possible (no negative secon4 best effects, positive sign of welfare change guaranteed).
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However, it is of a comparable size to that found by Fullerton and Henderson (1989).
They conclude that the "results indicate that distortions between sectors or among
industries are much smaller than previously thought. Distortions among assets are
larger, but the total of all these welfare costs is still below one percent of income."
(p.391). Their highest published welfare gain is 0.74 per cent of expanded (to include
the value of leisure time) national income. When the elasticities of asset substitution
and incorporation are both unity, welfare change is only .007 per cent. (No results are
given for the case of zero elasticities, which would compare best to our experiment).
This is lower than found in experiment one, but note that their denominator is higher.
Another reason for their lower figure may be that they do not correct for the price
elasticity of exports.
As such, their simulations compare better to our second experiment, where we con-
struct a reference scenario with capital market distortion, no taxes on goods and factors,
but no tariffs.
In the alternative scenario we remove the capital market distortion. This makes the
alternative scenario equal to what would have been optimal in a text-book model of first
best taxation. We know however, that this is not the case in the AGE model, because of
the ability of the country to improve its terms of trade. In fact, what should be done (in
the absence of tariffs) is to tax all factors at tariff equivalent rates, compare equations
(84) to (86). Ie capital should be taxed at different rates in different industries.
When comparing welfare in the two scenarios, we find, interestingly, that utility falls
by 1.08 percent. The existing system of capital taxation, despite being the result of the
fairly uncoordinated actions of overlapping fiscal authorities over many years17 , is closer
to the optimum than a system characterized by zero tax rates and an "equal playing
field".
This is the case despite the fact that the experiment represents a movement towards
the optimum (represented by equations (84) to (86)), as subsidies on capital are reduced
17The need for a through reform of the Norwegian system of capital taxation has recently been forcefully
argued by Aarbakke et. al. (1989).
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to zero without changing any other tax-rates. But welfare decreases. This demonstrates,
in an empirical context, the highly non linear relation between tax optima and tax re-
forms. It is well known that a movement towards the optimum not necessarily increases
welfare. Here is a demonstration of this possibility.
What explains the result is that the price of capital in exporting industries falls,
despite the removal of subsidies. One reason why it falls is that the most subsidized
industry, housing, is a sheltered industry. When subsidies on housing are eliminated,
demand for housing capital falls. In order to restore some of the housing demand, which
is necessary since aggregate capital is exogenous, the price of capital falls quite a lot.
For the average exporting industry, the net effect on the price of capital is comprised of
two opposite factors; the rise in price because the industry specific subsidy is removed,
and the fall in the economy wide price of capital. The latter is larger.
When the price of capital falls in exporting industries, terms of trade losses are
incurred. These lead to an overall welfare loss, despite the partially beneficial effects of
production efficiency.
Experiment one and two demonstrate that the optimal capital tax structure is vul-
nerable to the terms of trade implications of taxation when the price elasticities of
export demand take on values that are derived from econometric studies. But what if
the elasticities are higher?
Experiments three and four rework experiments one and two, with one important
difference: The export price elasticities are multiplied by a factor of 7.5. Table 2 shows
the optimal tariffs that apply now. At around 5 to 10 percent, they are certainly con-
siderable, although not at all as large as before.
(table 2 about here)
In experiment three, the tariffs of table 2 are introduced to the model, which again
is undistorted apart from capital market distortions. We are again moving from a non-
optimal to an optimal situation, and the question is not if there is a welfare gain, just
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how large it is. Notice that the only difference between experiment one and experiment
three is that tariffs are smaller in experiment three, corresponding to smaller price
elasticities of exports.
The welfare gain turns out to be 1.26 per cent of reference case welfare/consumption.
This is around 0.3 percentage points higher than in experiment one. An explanation for
the somewhat higher figure may be that larger price elasticities of trade induce larger
shifts in the sectoral allocation. The model is closer to the small open economy. Thereby
the economy responds more to changes in relative prices. It is known from public finance
theory that high elasticities of demands increase the costs of a given distortion. This
makes it possible to reap more gains when conditions are bettered, and a larger figure
should be expected in experiment three. On the other hand, a welfare gain of 1.26 per
cent clearly is in the same range as that suggested by experiment one.
The interesting question now is whether a capital tax reform constitutes a welfare
gain without tariffs, given these larger price elasticities. This is the theme of experiment
four. A priori, there are two effects at work. The production efficiency effect is the reason
the reform is beneficial in experiment three and a monopoly in trade effect works in
the direction of maintaining the present system of taxation.
It turns out a welfare gain of 1.13 per cent is realized. Increasing the openness of the
economy therefore transforms the welfare loss to a welfare gain, despite the considerable
terms of trade effects that remain. Note that the gain is lower than in experiment three,
indicating that the terms of trade argument is still valid, but its empirical impact has
been reduced to 0.15 per cent (the difference between experiments three and four). In
other words, tariff rates of ten per cent (or less), contribute insignificantly to welfare,
according to this model exercise.
Taken together, the experiments underline the message that the price elasticities of
exports are crucial for explaining welfare effects of tax reform as measured by AGE
models. Estimated, `low' price elasticities make the set of optimal capital tax rates
highly non-uniform, and 'levelling the playing field' decreases welfare. Optimal tariffs
add 2 percentage points to welfare in this case (the difference between experiments one
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and two). When elasticities are 'high' however, capital tax reform yields the correct
sign of welfare change, while the contribution of the price elasticities is down to 0.15.
The welfare impact of reform is in all cases in the same range as that found by Fullerton
and Henderson (1989). The results from our five experiments are summarized in table
3.
5 Concluding comments
The paper has argued that optimal taxation of AGE models that apply the Armington
assumption, in an important way is different from optimal taxation in the 'text-book'
model. It is optimal to tax exporters in order to bring home the monopoly profit of the
country on the foreign market. This tax is a feature of first (as well as second) best
taxation, as it is non-distorting from the domestic point of view. It just hurts foreigners.
The other main feature of the Armington approach to foreign trade, imports as vari-
eties of composites in consumption and material inputs, creates no problems compared
to the 'textbook' model. The reason for the difference is that market power falls on
exporters, not importers.
A simple implementation scheme for optimal taxation is one where production is
left untaxed, exporters are subject to a tariff, and consumers are taxed according to the
standard formula for optimal taxation — pure lump sum taxation in the first best
case, some combination of taxes on consumption composites and labour supply, and a
general poll tax in the second best case. Given the typical AGE modelling of consumer
preferences, indirect taxation should be uniform.
There is however, an infinite number of optimal taxation structures. Factor taxa-
tion can substitute for tariffs on exports. Even a large tariff levied on imports may
consistent with optimality, provided it is neutralized by other taxes in the system. This
demonstrates the indeterminacy of taxation within the model. An implication is that
assessments of the 'goodness' of a tax system should not be made on the basis of a
particular subset of tax rates, for instance whether or not there are tariffs on imports.
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The empirical importance of the elasticity of export demand on taxation can be very
lirge. We have demonstrated that, using time series estimates of the price elasticities of
export demand, the structure of taxation is totally dominated by the need for taxes to
act as implicit tariffs. Thus 'levelling the playing field' with respect to capital taxation
will, in the empirically estimated model of the Norwegian economy, lead to a lower level
of welfare. This clearly suggests that AGE-modelers should direct more attention to
the way the modelling of foreign trade in general, and in particular the price elasticities
of foreign demand, affect their results.
When the elasticities of export demand are raised to levels that imply optimal tariffs
of about 5 to 10 per cent, their empirical significance almost disappear. This demon-
strates that policy experiments on taxation are vulnerable to the elasticities of trade.
In addition, the finding is interesting in its own right, since tariffs of 5 to 10 per cent
often is considered to be large. In terms of their impact on the domestic economy, this
paper does not support such a view.
Besides warning AGE modelers to be aware of the effect of elasticities of foreign
demand, this paper naturally adds to the skepticism against the Armington assumption.
Few people are convinced that tariff rates on exports of well above 100 per cent actually
are optimal, despite the overwhelming econometric evidence of "small" responses to
price changes in -the Armington-relation 18. Or to put it differently, on this matter the
empirical prediction of the model seems to be just plain wrong.
Yet it is because of its ability to rationalize the facts that the Armington assumption
came into fashion in the first place. Recall that it explains trade patterns better than
the 'small open economy assumption and that it prevents excessive specialization from
taking place. These are facts of economic life that we want our models to incorporate.
"Some will add that if it was time that industries had considerable market power, the present model
would not fit the facts anyway, as producers then would collude, and reap the tariff revenue for themselves.
The government should respond to this by imposing a profits tax, not tariffs. Ie when the price elasticities
are low, tariffs are close to zero, and when they are high, tariffs are zero because of collusion. Given
the estimated market power, collusion would however give exporters much larger profits than is actually
registered. The real problem therefore seems to lie with the price elasticities of export demand.
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The alternatives to the Armington model are not altogether satisfactory either. The
'small open economy' assumption with mobile factors is unsatisfactory because of the
specialization and net trades aspects. The alternative assumption of industry specific
fixed factors, which basically stops specialization by inducing decreasing returns to scale,
will in an optimal taxation framework naturally favour (direct or implicit) taxation of
the fixed factor. This is hardly, more desirable than the optimal tariffs of the Armington.
Yet another alternative is the CET formulation, which we have claimed is a special
case of our model where consumption of foreign varieties is negative (compare footnote
10). The terms of trade problem will not occur in this model but we can have export
tariffs in a second best optimum (just as we can have import tariffs when consumption
of foreign varieties is positive). It has been claimed that the CET formulation "may
severely understate the cost of protection" (de Milo and Robinson (1989), p.50), since it
is only an approximation to a 'full' imperfect competition model. The CET model may
in fact be taken to assume that the home country produces for the domestic market of
others (and even is a price taker on that market), while it is alone in producing for its
own domestic market.
Eventually, an imperfect competition/increasing returns framework seems a most
promising alternative. There are many ways to model imperfect competition however,
and it may still take some time before it is ready for serious empirical work. Besides, the
structure of optimal taxation in imperfect competition models is by no means simple
and intuitive (see eg. Myles (1989) or Konishi (1990) for two recent contributions).
The practical model builder has to choose between imperfect alternatives. For those
of us who for the time being are continuing to work with the Arnaington-formulation,
the main lesson of this paper is to be aware of the terms of trade element, to perform
sensitivity analyses to check its importance, and eventually to neutralize it, either by
artificial tariffs, or by larger than estimated price elasticities of demand.
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Table 1: Estimated price elasticities and optimal tariffs
Price elasticities Optimal tariffs
absolute values	 per cent
Purchased commodities from
agriculture and fishery	 1.230	 435
Beverages and tobacco	 1.700	 143
Textiles and wearing apparels	 1.783	 127
Timber, wood and wooden products	 1.700	 143
Printing and publishing	 2.416	 71
Chemical and mineral articles	 2.522	 66
Pulp and paper	 3.412	 41
Industrial chemicals	 1.390	 256
Metals	 1.844	 118
Machinery and equipment	 1.906	 110
Domestic transport services	 1.700	 143
Wholesale and retail trade	 1.700	 143
Table 2: Increased price elasticities and optimal tariffs
Price elasticities Optimal tariffs
absolute values	 per cent
Processed commodities from
agriculture and fishery	 9.22	 12.2
Beverages and tobacco	 12.75	 8.5
Textiles and wearing apparels	 13.37	 8.1
Timber, wood and wooden products 	 12.75	 8.5
Printing and publishing	 18.12	 5.8
Chemical and mineral articles	 18.92	 5.5
Pulp and paper	 25.59	 4.1
Industrial chemicals	 10.43	 10.6
Metals	 13.83	 7.8
Machinery and equipment	 14.30	 7.5
Domestic transport services	 12.75	 8.5 •
Wholesale and retail trade	 12.75	 8.5
Table 3: Welfare cost of distortions in the capital market
Percentage money metric
utility cost of capital market
distortions at 1986 prices
Estimated terms of trade elasticities,
optimal tariffs
Estimated terms of trade elasticities, no tariffs
7.5 times larger terms of trade elasticities,
optimal tariffs
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